Hitler and the German People - 3rd Critique

Hitler and the Germans

In the article “Hitler and the Germans,” Ian Kershaw describes seven key contributors to the almost mythological popularity of Adolf Hitler during the rise of Nazi power in Germany. The construction of this “Fuhrer cult around Hitler” is Kershaw’s main theme (p. 43). Kershaw points out how the Nazis used Hitler to consolidate their own power in Germany and how eventually, Hitler “came to believe in his own myth,” which later came to impair his judgment (Kershaw, p. 55). Kershaw suggests that it was Hitler being used by the Nazi party, rather than the more commonly held belief that Hitler used the Nazis to elevate himself to the position of Fuhrer. I had never considered this possibility and found Kershaw’s argument intriguing. I could even detect a hint of sympathy for Hitler in Kershaw’s tone, which is unusual.

Kershaw points out that even with Hitler’s public speaking expertise, his “mediocre,” sometimes “bizarre” and “wholly unpleasant” personality seems unable to account for his “extraordinary impact” (Kershaw, p. 41). Kershaw shows how the Nazi Party turned Hitler into “the Symbol of the Nation” by capitalizing on a few basic facts (eg. he was a solider; he was a common man, etc.) and spinning them into fantastic proportions (p. 46). There is no doubt that propaganda played a key role and Kershaw acknowledges that “Nazi propaganda … enjoyed a virtual monopoly within Germany” (p. 46). Goebbels was responsible for Nazi propaganda, and he claimed “in 1941 that the creation of the Hitler myth was his greatest propaganda achievement” (p. 47). Still, propaganda can only do so much.
For readers already familiar with German history, Kershaw does a decent job of detailing the various factors that bolstered the popularity of Hitler, which simultaneously benefited the Nazi agenda. However, without prior knowledge of the historical background, I’m not sure I would have fully appreciated Kershaw’s view. For example, Kershaw refers to the “Weimar political system and leadership [being] utterly bankrupt,” (p. 45) and to the “extreme fragmentation of Weimar politics” and the “total failure of Weimar democracy” (p. 42), as well as the significance of the “Nazi party’s breakthrough in the 1930 election” (p. 43). However, my prior knowledge of how Germany’s multiple political parties made the Weimar government incapable of making decisions may have helped me recognize the importance of that background information more than Kershaw’s passing comments. To be fair, such in depth detail was probably beyond the scope of this article’s purpose.
In addition, we learned in Lecture 9 of our Class Notes and our other readings this semester that political “disorder” would have been very unsettling to the “orderly” German people (Hoerle). When the Nazis became the largest political party in the Reichstag (Parliament), it seemed like “order had been restored” (Kershaw, p. 46). This accomplishment, coupled with the economic strides being made, would have lent credibility to Hitler’s “Superman” image beyond mere propaganda (Kershaw, p. 41). The Nazis surrounded Hitler with “toadies, flatterers and sycophants,” which “bolstered [his] increasing detachment from reality” (Kershaw, p. 54). Even though a few groups never did support Hitler, it took military defeats, particularly in Stalingrad, to finally turn “the tide of Hitler’s popularity,” and with its decline, the Nazi party also lost its power (Kershaw, p. 53). The two were unalterably linked.

I might have missed something, but I enjoyed this article more than the others we critiqued this semester. It was well-organized and provided a unique perspective (at least one I was unfamiliar with). I found Kershaw’s article very interesting and insightful, and I think it makes a significant contribution to our historical understanding of Hitler and the Third Reich.

Kershaw, Ian. “Hitler and the Germans.” In Richard Bessel, ed.
Life in the Third Reich. Oxford University Press. pp. 41-55.

Hoerle, Dr. W.S. “Guilt and Conformity: The Value Biases of the Stettin Gestapo, 1934-43”
University of Massachusetts Lowell, 43.373 Nazi Germany - Sec 031 SU12R