In “Political
Violence and the Nazi Seizure of Power,” Richard Bessel examines the role violence
played in helping Hitler and the Nazi party gain control of Germany in 1933. Bessel’s article is more exploratory than
persuasive. About midway through the
article, Bessel says the question is: “how important was political violence for
putting Nazis in the saddle?” (p. 6). Later,
he asks: “Who … was responsible for the
wave of violence on which the Nazi’s rode to power … and why did it occur?” (p.
12). Bessel admits that “the answers to
these questions are far from clear” (p. 12).
One could say the same about the presentation of this article. However, the point seems to come at the end,
where Bessel discusses the “paradox” of Nazi violence as being both a promise
of “radical change” while also “upholding … traditional values”; appealing to
both “roughness and respectability;” and perhaps most significantly, providing
an opportunity for unemployed young men to “prove their manliness,” while also giving
structure to their lives (p. 15). These
apparent contradictions make this article a little difficult to follow, but
also provide an insightful perspective about this critical moment in history.
Initially,
Bessel says that historical views of Germany’s transfer of power to Hitler as
being mostly peaceful, is “rather disingenuous” since the “Nazi activists did
not shrink from violence; indeed they gloried in it” (Bessel, p. 1). Bessel then describes several instances of
S.A. storm trooper, “terror tactics” against Nazi opposition from the
Communists and the powerful trade unions (p. 4). Bessel implies that the views of other
historical writers, such as Alan Bullock, reduced the role of S.A. brutality to
mere “backstairs intrigue” (p. 2).
Therefore, Bessel seems to be pointing to “the spontaneous attacks by
marauding bands of storm troopers,” as being a vital factor in Hitler’s
takeover of Germany (p. 5). In a related
theme, Bessel implies that if Nazi opposition from the Communists and Social
Democrats could have formed some kind of alliance, they might have been able to
stop Hitler’s plans. However, he then
states that even if the “Left united and made a stand the outcome would [not]
have been much better” (p. 5).
Later,
Bessel paints the storm trooper “terror campaign,” as a kind of testing the waters of their opposition,
one that the Nazi party could “take full advantage of” when they were
successful, but could also be safely “disowned” if the “violent outbursts” met “stiff
opposition” (p.7). Bessel ends by
stating that the “storm troopers generally steered well clear of out-and-out
terrorism” and says the “violence in which the Nazis were engaged” was “limited”
(p.15). He provides detailed examples
that support all claims being made, which could make Bessel’s overall argument seem
either confusing or very thorough, depending on the reader’s view.
The
message I understood from Bessel’s article is that young, macho, out of work
guys who made up the majority of the S.A. at that time, might not have behaved as
fanatically as the Irish IRA, or Al Queda
(at that point), but they certainly didn’t mind beating up or killing men
that were in Hitler’s way. The Nazi show
of force was strategic, and certainly helped to eliminate Hitler’s enemies, but
excessive destruction would have shifted public opinion against the Nazis in
those critical early days. Since most of
the political gains Hitler made were done within the law, a violent upheaval of
German society was not necessary and would have been detrimental to his ultimate
goals. While the presentation of
Bessel’s article can seem a little confusing, that’s because the role that
violence played in Hitler’s rise to power is complicated. Bessel refers to it as “hooliganism,” and
that’s as good a label as any (p. 15).
It is an important contribution to the history of this time period,
because it does present all the facets involved.
Bessel,
Richard. “Political Violence and the Nazi Seizure of Power.” Life in the Third
Reich. Oxford Univ. Press. 1987.
Pp. 1 – 15.
